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Baroque Optics and the Disappearance
of the Observer: From Kepler’s Optics
to Descartes’ Doubt
Ofer Gal and Raz Chen-Morris
INTRODUCTION
In the seventeenth century the human observer gradually disappeared from
optical treatises. It was a paradoxical process: the naturalization of the eye
estranged the mind from its objects. Turned into a material optical instru-
ment, the eye no longer furnished the observer with genuine representations
of visible objects. It became a mere screen, on which rested a blurry array
of light stains, accidental effects of a purely causal process. It thus befell the
intellect to decipher one natural object—a flat image of no inherent episte-
mic value—as the vague, reversed reflection of another, wholly independent
object. In reflecting on and trespassing the boundaries between natural and
artificial, orderly and disorderly, this optical paradox was a Baroque intel-
lectual phenomenon; and it was the origin of Descartes’ celebrated doubt—
whether we know anything at all.
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JOHANNES KEPLER: ARTIFICIOSA OBSERVATIONES
The human observer began to slip out of optics when Kepler discussed the
concept of artificial observations in his Paralipomena Ad Vitellionem1:
On 1602 21/31 December at 6h in the morning, through a . . .
[camera obscura] and an instrument made for this purpose . . . the
moon made an image of itself brightly upon the paper lying below,
inverted in situation, just as it was in the heavens, gibbous. . . .
You should not think that . . . the moon’s ray was in the paper, for
both the gibbous face and the spot in its middle were carried over
to all parts of the paper . . . indeed, it was from moving the paper
that the spot was first discovered.2
The observation, Kepler stressed, was not his. It was no one’s. The image
of the moon was not the culmination of a cognitive process. It did not
require an observer; a piece of paper was enough, and the paper could
be moved around without affecting the production of the image. Image
production is the main concern of Ad Vitellionem; being ‘‘The Optical Part
of Astronomy,’’ it is about the making of observations rather than their
content. Earlier in the book Kepler established the legitimacy and efficiency
of his main instrument of artificiosa observationes (the term he used in
one of the subtitles), the camera obscura, by demonstrating that the image
obtained through it is indeed that of the observed object.3 He went on to
elucidate its underlying principle—the formation of an image on a screen
behind a small aperture—by way of physical simulation. He set ‘‘a book on
a high place to stand as a luminous body’’ and ‘‘a tablet with a polygonal
1 Johannes Kepler, Ad Vitellionem, in Gesammelte Werke (GW) 1571–1630, ed. Walther
von Dyck and Max Caspar (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1937–); Optics, trans. William H.
Donahue (Santa Fe, N. M.: Green Lion Press, 2000). We will use Ad Vitellionem to refer
to the original Latin in GW and Optics to refer to Donahue’s translation.
2 Kepler, Optics, 259.
3 The relation between the camera obscura and the eye is at the heart of the historio-
graphic debate concerning Kepler’s optics. For Stephen Straker (Kepler’s Optics, and c.f.
A. C. Crombie’s Robert Grosseteste) the instrument represents Kepler’s novel commit-
ment to the mechanization of the eye and his indebtedness to the artisanal tradition.
David Lindberg, in contrast, arguing for Kepler’s reliance on the perspectivist tradition,
stresses that ‘‘only on one occasion did [Kepler] explicitly compared the eye to a camera
obscura’’ (Lindberg, Theories of Vision from Al-Kindi to Kepler [Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1976], 206). We argue that Kepler’s main motivation is the legitimation
of artificiosa observationes.
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hole’’ under it. He stretched threads from the book’s corners grazing the
edges of the hole and found that the four images of the hole were repro-
duced on the floor in reverse order. When this process was repeated from
(ideally) every point of the book, ‘‘a narrow row of infinite figures’’ similar
to the hole ‘‘outline the large quadrangular [reversed] figure of the book on
the pavement.’’4
This was a novel solution to an age-old mystery, formulated already by
Pseudo-Aristotle: ‘‘why does the sun penetrating through quadrilaterals
form not rectilinear shapes but circles?’’5 It was novel, indeed revolutionary,
because it abandoned the fundamental assumption of all previous attempts
to answer the question: that the pinhole image is a unique re-presentation
of the sun.6 For Kepler’s perspectivist predecessors, the circular image was
not caused by the sun and by light; it was the true form of the sun or the
perfect dissemination proper of light; the circularity of the image was a sign
of its indubitable authenticity. ‘‘The spherical shape is associated with
light,’’ John Pecham characteristically explained, ‘‘therefore, light is natu-
rally moved toward this shape.’’7 Even Francesco Maurolyco, who replaced
this ‘‘natural association’’ with a geometrical account, preserved the essen-
tial similarity between source and image: the image cast through the aper-
ture is composed of many images, not of the hole, but of the luminous
body.8
This similarity completely disappeared from Kepler’s account, together
with the exactness of representation it ensured. There was nothing unique
to the circularity of the pinhole image: a rectangular body, like the book,
would produce a rectangular image. Neither did the pinhole image repre-
sent light; light was simulated by the threads pulled through the hole, but
4 Kepler, Ad Vitellionem, GW, 56.
5 Aristotle, ‘‘Problems’’ in The Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. Jonathan Barnes
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), Bk 15, Ch. 6, 911b1, 2:1417.
6 David Lindberg, ‘‘The Theory of Pinhole Images from Antiquity to the Thirteenth Cen-
tury,’’ Archives for the History of Exact Sciences 5 (1968): 154–76; ‘‘The Theory of
Pinhole Images in the Fourteenth century,’’ Archive for the History of Exact Sciences 6
(1969): 299–328; E. Broydrick Thro, ‘‘Leonardo’s Early Work on the Pinhole Camera,’’
Achademia Leonardi Vinci 9 (1996): 20–54; John Pecham, John Pecham and the Science
of Optics, ed. and trans. David Lindberg (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1970),
67; Giora Hon and Yaakov Zik, ‘‘Geometry of Light and Shadow,’’ Annals of Science 64
(2007): 549–78.
7 Pecham, John Pecham and the Science of Optics, 70–71. See also Lindberg’s ‘‘Laying
the Foundations of Geometrical Optics,’’ in The Discourse of Light from the Middle Ages
to the Enlightenment (Los Angeles: William Clark Memorial Library, 1985), esp. 26–29.
8 Lindberg, ‘‘Laying the Foundations,’’ esp. 37–40; Hon and Zik, ‘‘Geometry of Light
and Shadow,’’ esp. 561.
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the image projected on the pavement could be of any object, not necessarily
luminous—a book, for example. The trustworthiness of the projection, for
Kepler, did not rest on its perfect loyalty to the object projected but on
understanding the physical process of projection. Indeed, Kepler discov-
ered, one could not hope for such loyalty: the book-pattern on the floor
was created by a ‘‘narrow row’’ of partially overlapping ‘‘figures,’’ so not
only was the image reversed, its boundaries were fuzzy. Finally, these stains
were reflections of the aperture. Kepler’s ‘‘figures’’ bore no resemblance to
the light source. The ‘‘outline . . . on the pavement’’ was only a ‘‘large
quadrangular figure’’ comprising aperture-like light stains. It bore no essen-
tial resemblance to the book.
THE CHALLENGE OF ASTRONOMY
Kepler’s interest was in the legitimation of the instrument he presented,
not its demise. The challenge he took in Ad Vitellionem was ‘‘to preserve
astronomy’s dignity and subdue the hostile fortress of doubt,’’9 and his
worry was real. One of the first tasks assigned to Kepler by Tycho Brahe
was to defend the epistemological integrity of the new astronomy against
the charges of Aristotelians like Ursus,10 that the heavens were too far prop-
erly to observe and that ‘‘the evidence [concerning celestial bodies] is
furnished but scantily by sensation.’’11 That Tycho’s observations were me-
diated by instruments made their defense that much more complex.
But the most acute need for epistemological justification was created
by Kepler’s own astronomical ambitions. ‘‘Physicists, prick up your ears!’’
he would declare in his Astronomia Nova, ‘‘for here is raised a deliberation
involving an inroad to be made into your province.’’12 Physical claims were
clearly beyond the realm of astronomy, as astronomers themselves stressed:
9 Kepler, Ad Vitellionem, GW, 6.
10 Nicholas Jardine, The Birth of History and Philosophy of Science (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1984). One finds similar Aristotelian complaints in Zabarella,
Carbone, and others: Heikki Mikkeli, An Aristotelian Response to Renaissance Human-
ism: Jacopo Zabarella on the Nature of Arts and Sciences (Helsinki: Suomen Historialli-
nen Seura, 1992); W. R. Laird,. ‘‘Galileo and the Mixed Sciences,’’ in Method and Order
in Renaissance Philosophy of Nature, ed. D. A. Di Liscia, Eckhard Kessler, and Charlotte
Methuen (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1997), 253–70.
11 Aristotle, ‘‘Parts of Animals’’ in The Complete Works (CW), Bk 1.5, 644b, 1003.
12 Johannes Kepler, New Astronomy, trans. William Donahue (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1992), 89.
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God the Creator placed these bodies so far away from our senses
that we are unable to produce principles of demonstration for
them . . . or to discover . . . the causes of particular appearances.13
Even Kepler’s own mentors, Tycho and Michael Maestlin, insisted that any
claims to ‘‘principles’’ or ‘‘causes’’ in the heavenly realm lay beyond the
boundaries of astronomical knowledge. ‘‘No one is able to ascend to the
aethereal region,’’ remarked Maestlin, ‘‘where he would see everything in
person,’’14 and the eye was particularly deficient in providing the evidence
required for the physica coelestis that Kepler envisioned:
the eyes are attached to the head, so, through the head, they are
attached to the body; through the body, to the ship or the house,
or to the entire region and its perceptible horizon.15
Hopelessly embodied and situated, ‘‘the sense of vision is in error
about the movable.’’16 It was thus unable to adjudicate between ‘‘Coperni-
cus, whom I follow,’’17 Ptolemy, and Tycho, let alone support the ambitious
physical claims of Kepler’s new astronomy. And since (reiterating Maestlin)
we do not have ‘‘someone . . . to carry us across to the moon or to another
of the wandering stars’’18 (which will help little anyhow, he points out),
Kepler required a new agent to bridge the epistemological rift and to carry
images from far away.
LIGHT AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF OPTICS
Kepler’s agent was light:
From the Sun and the colors illuminated by the Sun, species flow
. . . until for whatever reason, they fall on an opaque medium,
13 Nicodemus Frischlin, De Astronomicae Artis . . . (Frankfurt, 1586), 41, quoted in
Nicholas Jardine, ‘‘Epistemology of the Sciences,’’ in Cambridge History of Renaissance
Philosophy, ed. C. B. Schmitt, Quentin Skinner, Eckhard Kessler, and Jill Kraye (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 700. See also Peter Barker and Bernard Gold-
stein, ‘‘Realism and Instrumentalism in Sixteenth Century Astronomy: A Reappraisal,’’
Perspectives on Science 6 (1998): 232–58.
14 Michael Maestlin, De Astronomiae hypothesibus . . . (Heidelberg, 1582) A2r. Tycho
Brahe, Epistolarum astronomicarum libri (Uraniburg, 1596), 111.
15 Kepler, Optics, 336.
16 Ibid., 335.
17 Ibid., 338.
18 Ibid., 336.
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where they paint their source: and vision is produced, when the
opaque screen of the eye is painted this way. . . . For, there are
certain passions of light . . . illuminating and altering the screens
[of the eye] through which colors, that is to say light, are not only
poured upon but are also imprinted.19
It was light that created images, bouncing off ‘‘an opaque medium’’ and
falling on an ‘‘opaque screen.’’ If the screen happened to be the eye, ‘‘vision
is produced,’’ but there was nothing unique to the eye: any screen would
do.
With light as the sole agent of all optical phenomena, there was no
fundamental epistemological difficulty with observing the distant celestial
objects: the mathematical nature of light and the assumption that its rays
did not decay, but only dispersed (propositions 6 and 7 of Ad Vitellionem),
turned distance into nothing but an element in the geometrical analysis of
observation.20 With light, there was also no epistemological difficulty with
artificiosa observationes. The image on the pavement was reversed and
fuzzy, but so was the one on the retina. The instrument was trustworthy
not because it did not interfere with the visual flow, but because it was no
worse than the eye.
This epistemological gain entailed a transformation of optics. The sub-
ject matter of traditional optics was human vision.21 Vision was a direct
acquaintance of the visual faculty with visible objects, and the communica-
tion of these objects to the eye was self-evidently teleological: the optical
process was aimed at providing adequate images of objects for the intellect.
‘‘A species produced by a visible object has the essential property of mani-
festing the object of which it is the likeness,’’ wrote Pecham.22 This funda-
mental assumption survived throughout the Renaissance; summarizing
scholastic optics for his audience of painters and art patrons, it was the
teleology that Alberti chose to stress:
19 Kepler, Ad Vitellionem, 41–42.
20 For Kepler’s mathematization of light see Ofer Gal and Raz Chen-Morris, ‘‘The Ar-
chaeology of the Inverse Square Law Part I,’’ History of Science 43 (2005): 391–414.
21 A. Mark Smith, ‘‘Getting the Big Picture in Perspectivist Optics,’’ Isis 72 (1981):
568–89 and ‘‘What is the History of Medieval Optics Really About?’’ Proceedings of the
American Philosophical Society 148 (2004): 180–94. For the role of visual impressions
in medieval spirituality see: Katherine Park, ‘‘Impressed Images: Reproducing Wonders,’’
in Picturing Science, Producing Art, ed. Caroline Jones and Peter Galison (New York:
Routledge, 1998), 254–71; Jeffrey Hamburger, ‘‘Seeing and Believing,’’ in Imagination
und Wirklichkeit, ed. Alessandro Nova and Klaus Kru¨ger (Mainz, 2000), 47–69.
22 Pecham, John Pecham and the Science of Optics, 161.
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FIGURE 1: Descartes, ‘‘Figure 17’’ from La Dioptrique.
Philosophers . . . say that surfaces are measured by certain rays,
ministers of vision as it is [quasi visendi ministries], which they
therefore call visual rays, since by their agency the images of things
are impressed upon the senses. (see Figure 1)23
While the physical nature of the ‘‘ministers of vision’’ was debated
since antiquity, neither their ‘‘agency’’ nor the ‘‘essential likeness’’ of the
‘‘images of things’’ they ‘‘impressed upon the senses’’ were ever in doubt.
For Grosseteste, vision was carried by ‘‘a natural agent [which] continu-
ously multiplies its power . . . sometimes called species, sometimes like-
ness.’’24 Roger Bacon underscored this essential relation: ‘‘species is similar
in essence and definition to the agent and the things generating it.’’25 The
23 Leon Battista Alberti, On Painting and On Sculpture, ed. and trans. C. Grayson (Lon-
don: Phaidon, 1972), 41.
24 Robert Grosseteste, ‘‘De lineis angulis et figuris,’’ in Die Philosophischen Werke des
Robert Grosseteste, ed. Ludwig Baur, Beitra¨ge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittel-
alters 9 (Mu¨nster: Aschendorff, 1912), 60.
25 Roger Bacon, Roger Bacon’s Natural Philosophy, ed. and trans. David Lindberg (Ox-
ford: Clarendon Press, 1983), 7. C.f. Smith, ‘‘Getting the Big Picture’’; Leen Spruit, Spe-
cies Intelligibilis: From Perception to Knowledge (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1994); Katherine
Tachau, Vision and Certitude in the Age of Ockham: Optics, Epistemology and the Foun-
dations of Semantics 1250–1345 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1988); Dallas G. Denery, Seeing and
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multiplication assured the trustworthiness of the visual agents and turned
optics into the epistemological anchor of scholasticism; optics legitimated
natural philosophy by accounting for the fundamental knowability of
God’s creation.26 The analysis of the eye provided the same assurance of
intentionality and veracity of vision, as Pecham stressed: ‘‘vision takes place
by the arrangement of the species on the glacial humour exactly as [the
parts] of the object [are arranged] outside.’’ 27 This was so, precisely because
‘‘unless this were so, the eye would not see the object distinctly.’’28 Optics,
Pecham assumed, was a theory of visual perception, and any theory that
failed to account for the adequacy of the seen image was ipso facto false.29
Whatever was their essence, the ministri visendi were never conflated
with light. A necessary condition of vision, light was obviously of interest.
It was observed and experimented on, and the results generalized to other,
less accessible species.30 Witelo, for example, listed in the preface to his
Perspectiva ‘‘Visual rays, lights, colors and forms’’ as examples of the ema-
nation of species, which had undergone the same ‘‘projection, infraction
and refraction’’ and could be dealt through the same ‘‘geometrical ele-
ments.’’31 For Neoplatonists in particular light was the very paradigm of
emanation.32 Yet light was never assumed as the agent vision. Kepler was
the first to declare that ‘‘genuine vision occurs when the folding door or
pupil of the eye is exposed most closely to the arriving ray of light.’’33 Nam-
ing his book after Witelo, Kepler readily acknowledged his indebtedness to
the perspectivist tradition,34 but his optics was no longer an account of how
the ‘‘visible object’’ recreated its ‘‘likeness’’ in the eye; it was a mathemati-
cal-physical theory of the formation of images by light.35
Being Seen in the Later Medieval World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005),
esp. 82–96.
26 Smith, ‘‘Getting the Big Picture,’’ 569.
27 Pecham, John Pecham and the Science of Optics, 121 (italics added).
28 Ibid.
29 C.f. Stephen Gaukroger in Rene´ Descartes, The World and Other Writing, ed. and
trans. Gaukroger (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 159–61.
30 C.f. Abdelhamid Sabra, ‘‘Alhazen’s Optics in Europe,’’ in Inside the Camera Obscura,
ed. Wolfgang Lefe`vre (Berlin: 2007), 53–58. A. Mark Smith, ‘‘Saving the Appearances of
the Appearances,’’ Archive for the History of Exact Science 24 (1981): 73–99; ‘‘Ptolemy’s
Search for a Law of Refraction,’’ Archive for the History of Exact Science 26 (1982):
221–40.
31 Witello, Perspectiva, ‘‘Ad Lectorem.’’
32 Lindberg, ‘‘The Genesis,’’ 10.
33 Ibid., 78 (Prop. 3, chap. 3).
34 C.f. David Lindberg’s Theories of Vision.
35 Carl Boyer, The Rainbow (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987 [1959]); A. C.
Crombie, Robert Grosseteste and the Origins of Experimental Science 1100–1700 (Ox-
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THE CONSEQUENCES
One could hardly overstate the significance of Kepler’s reformulation of
optics. Produced by light, images were mere causal effects; stains of light
which accidentally bounced off objects and fell on screens. Kepler’s optics
had no place for forms and visual rays, and without them the teleology of
the optical process was lost, together with the essential veridicality of vision
and the importance of optics as an epistemological anchor for all other
sciences.36
Kepler’s optics was as much epistemologically-oriented as traditional
optics, but instead of guaranteeing the authenticity of human visual knowl-
edge in general, it was aimed at supporting the empirical underpinning of
Kepler’s new astronomy, and long distance instrumental observation in
particular. Since light was the producer of all images, the similarity of form
between the sun and its projection—or the book and the ‘‘figure . . . on the
pavement’’—no longer meant that the process connecting them had any
inherent epistemic value. ‘‘All celestial observation takes place through the
mediation of light and shadow’’37; we can trust images because they are
outcomes of a purely natural, causal process which we can investigate
through experimenting and theorizing. This meant that we can trust obser-
vations of stars as much as those of books, and we can trust instrumental,
artificial observations as much as we trust our eye.
Yet this trust comes with a steep epistemological price tag: if the instru-
ment is not prone to error more than the eye, then the eye is as vulnerable
to error as the instrument. Passively receiving ‘‘illumination’’ like any in-
strument, the eye is not merely comparable to ‘‘a closed chamber’’—it is
one: ‘‘the pupil takes the place of the window.’’38 The cornea is truly noth-
ing but a lens; the retina nothing but a screen, essentially the same as the
paper or the pavement. The picture on the retina, like the one on paper or
the pavement, is not an accurate reflection of the object. It is a fuzzy ‘‘row
of infinite figures,’’ the shape of each caused by the accidental shape of the
aperture; ‘‘the pupil’’ or ‘‘the window.’’
ford: Oxford University Press, 1953), 281; for Robert Grosseteste, De Iride, in Bruce S.
Eastwood, The Geometrical Optics of Robert Grosseteste (PhD dissertation, University
of Wisconsin, 1964); Lindberg, ‘‘The Genesis’’; Stephen Straker, Kepler’s Optics (PhD
Dissertation, Indiana University, 1971); Antoni Malet, ‘‘Keplerian Illusions: Geometrical
Pictures versus Optical Images in Kepler’s Visual Theory,’’ Studies in History and Philoso-
phy of Science 21 (1990): l-40.
36 Smith, ‘‘What is the History,’’ esp. 181–83.
37 Kepler, Optics, 13 (italics added).
38 Ibid., 184.
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Kepler’s optics abandoned the epistemological assuredness that tradi-
tional optics provided by relinquishing the assumption that ‘‘the arrange-
ment of the species [is] exactly as the object.’’ For Kepler, ‘‘it has been
demonstrated most clearly, from the very structure of vision, that it fre-
quently happens, that an error befalls the sense of vision.’’39 Visual errors
were of course nothing new, but Kepler’s was a new concept of error.40 In
the Aristotelian paradigm, errors were created by the intervention of the
human imagination; the visual data were indubitable. With the new optics
the doubt was directed at the very images perceived. ‘‘The deficiency im-
pinges on the sense of vision’’41; the fuzziness is a feature of the optical
phenomenon itself, and errors follow ‘‘from the very structure of vision.’’
Kepler was no skeptic. On the contrary, much of Ad Vitellionem was
dedicated to accounting for the reliability of the retinal image. Indeed, the
book experiment demonstrated that the pattern on the screen did corre-
spond to the projected object. But the very need for such demonstration
was a troubled admission: instead of ‘‘likenesses,’’ all the eye could provide
were these fuzzy retinal images; causal effects of light. It was left for the
intellect to decipher natural objects of one kind (stains of light), as marks
for objects of a different kind; how the intellect met the challenge remained
a complete mystery:
How this image or picture is joined together with the visual spirits
that reside in the retina and in the nerve, and whether it is ar-
raigned within by the spirits into the caverns of the cerebrum to
the tribunal of the soul or of the visual faculty; whether the visual
faculty, like a magistrate, given by the soul, descending from the
headquarters of the cerebrum outside to the visual nerve itself and
the retina, as to lower courts, might go forth to meet this image—
this, I say, I leave to the natural philosophers to argue about.42
This was the optical paradox: the naturalization of the eye estranges
the observer, and a deeper understanding of optics turns vision into a mys-
39 Ibid., 236 (italics added).
40 Giora Hon, ‘‘On Kepler’s Awareness of the Problem of Experimental Error,’’ Annals of
Science 44 (1987): 545–91; and his ‘‘Putting Error to (Historical) Work,’’ Centaurus 46
(2004): 58–81.
41 Hon, ‘‘Putting Error to (Historical) Work,’’ 69.
42 Kepler, Optics, 180. In a private communication, Antoni Malet argued that Kepler’s
reference to the arguments of philosophers is ironic. This may very well be the case, yet it
should not obscure his clear awareness to the epistemological query resulting from his
new optics.
200
Gal and Chen-Morris ✦ Kepler’s Optics
tery. Years later, in his Harmonices Mundi, Kepler would attempt a meta-
physical resolution to this mystery, through the mathematical infrastructure
divinely endowed in both nature and human intellect.43 Yet the paradox
could not be resolved by optical theory, and Kepler left the resolution ‘‘to
the natural philosophers,’’ and out of Ad Vitellionem.
ANXIETIES, SOLUTIONS, AND COMPROMISES:
PRACTITIONERS
Mirrors, lenses, and the camera obscura were common instruments of prac-
tical optics. Their use, in this tradition, was playful: Giambattista della
Porta wrote about ‘‘experiments [to] follow the imaginary conceits of the
mind,’’ boasting ‘‘I have oft made sport with the most fair women with
these glasses.’’44 Della Porta’s playful use of optical devices was based on
their ability to distort,45 but the distortion was not of the eye. These were
‘‘imaginary conceits of the mind’’ that his instruments produced. The eyes
of the ‘‘fair women’’ received exactly the ‘‘forms’’46 that della Porta’s lenses
and mirrors delivered; it was their feeble minds that could be tricked to
judge them ‘‘hanging in the air.’’ The weak eye could be helped by instru-
ments like ‘‘spectacles, whereby poor blinde people can . . . see all things,’’47
but the sense of vision itself could not be ‘‘conceited.’’ ‘‘The Image that falls
on your sight’’48 was exactly the one that would be made available to the
intellect.
For Kepler there was no vision without ‘‘the conceits of the mind.’’ The
pictura on the retina was a natural object, an aggregate of partially overlap-
ping pupil-shaped stains of light. The intellect ‘‘meets this image’’ and con-
structs a visual representation—three-dimensional, smooth-contoured, and
upright. This very separation, the independent existence of an optical ob-
ject, prior to its being considered by ‘‘the tribunal of the soul or of the
visual faculty,’’ was completely foreign to della Porta.49 Even though ‘‘im-
ages should appear outwardly, hanging in the air,’’ della Porta never sug-
43 Kepler, Harmonices Mundi, in GW, 6:104; 223; 303–4.
44 Giambattista della Porta, Natural Magick (London, 1658), 355, 356.
45 Also to reveal and enhance (della Porta, Natural Magick, 361).
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid., 356.
49 Sven Dupre´, ‘‘Inside the Camera Obscura: Kepler’s Experiment and Theory of Optical
Imagery,’’ Early Science and Medicine 13 (2008): 219–44.
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gested that the image was in midair. The image had no existence but that
perceived. The intellect did not observe images. It observes objects, which
it may perceive properly or distorted. This perception is the image.
Kepler’s understanding of visual representation as constructed thus
placed him outside the cultural milieu of della Porta and the optical magi-
cians. It was closer to the realism (or naturalism50) of painters of the Dutch
or ‘‘northern’’ school, with their attempt to capture the naked, optical phe-
nomenon that is the retinal image, before being processed by the higher
faculties. From this vantage point, high Renaissance painterly tools like
Alberti-style perspective, imposed ideal mathematical structure on visual
reality which was essentially blurred. Keplerian optics did not imply that
the use of these tools is disingenuous or a mere stylistic whim. Rather, it
suggested that their success did not stem from capturing independent reality
or perfect vision, but from recapitulating the operation of the ‘‘visual spir-
its,’’ which turned inverted and fuzzy retinal images into well-delineated
objects of perception.51
The detail-loaded paintings from Van Eyck to Bailly as well as Ver-
meer’s and Fabritius’s camera obscura-like works bore the signs of this ad-
herence to the pure optical image exactly in appearing wrong in either
perspective (for instance the relative size of the figures in Fabritius’s View
of Delft and Vermeer’s Officer and a Laughing Girl), lighting (the spots of
light and the blurred outlines of Vermeer’s View of Delft), or both (Ver-
meer’s Milkmaid).52 ‘‘Vermeer seems to have been delighted by the optical
effects of the lens and tried to recreate them on the canvas’’ writes David
Hockney.53 Unlike Della Porta, Vermeer’s delight did not come from the
distortion, but from the ability to recreate the pre-ordered, pre-cognitive
visual reality. The realism of the Baroque seized Kepler’s ‘‘narrow row of
infinite figures’’ just before being ‘‘joined together with the visual spirits,’’
and recaptured it as it is on ‘‘the opaque screen of the eye.’’54
The camera obscura was a mere instrument for Della Porta, at most
50 David Summers, The Judgment of Sense: Renaissance Naturalism and the Rise of Aes-
thetics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).
51 Svetlana Alpers, The Art of Describing: Dutch Art in the Seventeenth Century (Chi-
cago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), 44.
52 Philip Steadman, Vermeer’s Camera: Uncovering the Truth behind the Masterpieces
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
53 David Hockney, Secret Knowledge: Rediscovering the Lost Techniques of the Old Mas-
ters (New York: Viking Studio, 2001), 58. On Hockney’s thesis see Early Science and
Medicine 10:2 (2005); Michael John Gorman, ‘‘Art, Optics and History: New Light on
the Hockney Thesis,’’ Leonardo 36 (2003): 295–301.
54 Kepler, Ad Vitellionem, 181.
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analogically comparable to the eye. For Vermeer, it was a way to recreate
the image that light paints on ‘‘the white of the retina.’’ For Kepler, the eye
and the camera obscura were one and the same.
PICTURES AND IMAGES
The naturalization of the eye meant separation between image creation and
visual perception; optics was no longer a theory of vision. Despite avowing
to ‘‘leave to the natural philosophers to argue about’’ the consequences of
this separation, Kepler attempted to ward off at least the implication that
all visual experience is a fabrication of the human mind, and ipso facto
distorted. For this purpose he evoked an old definition of the distorted
‘‘image’’ (imago): ‘‘the image is the vision of a certain object linked to an
error of the faculties concurrent with vision . . . better called an imaginary
fabrication.’’55 Traditionally the error that defined ‘‘image’’ was caused by
mediation of a lens or a mirror.56 Kepler, however, had already established
that all human vision involves instrument-like mediation, so in contrast to
the erroneous imago he had to set up a purely physical entity preceding all
intervention of the visual faculties: ‘‘up to now an image has been [consid-
ered] a rational entity, now figures of objects truly existing on paper, or
other screens, are called pictures.’’57 The image is a ‘‘rational entity’’ be-
cause it is ‘‘an imaginary fabrication’’ of the mind. The picture (pictura),
in contrast, is a genuine physical effect. It can be on the retina ‘‘or other
screens’’—what is important is not that it is unmediated by instruments,
but that it is free of any intellection.58
The ontological distinction, however, could not alleviate the epistemo-
logical worry that all vision is in and of itself distorted. The physical exis-
tence of an unmediated, undistorted physical image did not provide for
unmediated, undistorted visual perception. Kepler’s analysis entails that we
have no access to the pre-fabricated retinal images anymore than to the un-
55 Kepler, GW, 2: 60.
56 Pecham, John Pecham and the Science of Optics, 170.
57 Kepler, GW, 2:174. For a technical analysis of the distinction in Kepler and beyond see
A. E. Shapiro, ‘‘Images: Real and Virtual, Projected and Perceived, from Kepler to De-
chales,’’ Early Science and Medicine 12 (2008): 270–312.
58 A. Mark Smith, ‘‘Ptolemy, Alhazen, and Kepler and the Problem of Optical Images,’’
Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 8 (1998): 9–44; Raz Chen-Morris, ‘‘From Emblems to
Diagrams: Kepler’s New Pictorial Language of Scientific Representation,’’ Renaissance
Quarterly 62 (2009): 134–70.
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mediated objects or to the ‘‘pictures’’ on screens other than the retina. The
mind, according to Kepler’s own account, is furnished always with an al-
ready-constructed image, ‘‘arraigned’’ from a multitude of light stains on
the retina by the ‘‘visual spirit’’ or the ‘‘visual faculty’’ itself, ‘‘descending
from the headquarters of the cerebrum.’’
SCHEINER AND THE JESUIT COMPROMISE
For the Jesuit mathematician Christoph Scheiner, this tyranny of mediation
and its disturbing epistemological ramifications were too much to take.59 In
his Oculus, published some fifteen years after the Ad Vitellionem, he re-
jected the reduction of optics to a theory of image production by light and
attempted to preserve the Aristotelian teleology of vision:
In order to see, the eye of the animal is assigned by God to dis-
charge the function of acquiring the presence of the visible things
[rerum videndarum]. The things are made present to the eye . . .
[by rays] admitted into the eye from the objects.60
Scheiner’s eye had retained—or returned to—its traditional role: the
terminus ad quem of the optical process; discharging the divine task of
‘‘acquiring the presence of the visible things.’’ Its relation to ‘‘the things’’
had also returned to be immediate and self-authenticating; the things them-
selves ‘‘are made present’’ to the eye.
Scheiner hoped to maintain the empirical achievements of the new op-
tics, especially concerning the physiology of the eye, but without commit-
ting himself to its fundamental novelty and the epistemological predicament
it implied. He thus admitted that the retina is the visually sensitive part of
the eye and that the crystalline humor functioned as a lens while interpret-
ing these findings in the traditional terms of visual rays and species. The
title of the first chapter of his third book—‘‘in which it is explained, how
59 For other Jesuit treatment of Kepler’s optics see Franciscus Aguilonius, Opticae libri VI
(Antwerp, 1613). For Scheiner’s indebtedness to Kepler’s optics see also: Iasbelle Pantin,
‘‘Simulacrum, Species, Forma, Imago: What Was Transported by Light into the Camera
Obscura?’’ Early Science and Medicine 13 (2008): 245–69; see also Paolo Mancosu,
‘‘Acoustics and Optics’’ in The Cambridge History of Science (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2006), esp. 3: 613–18.
60 Christoph Scheiner, Oculus (Innsbruck, 1619), 2.
204
Gal and Chen-Morris ✦ Kepler’s Optics
the visual ray stimulates the retinal membrane and the reason for the struc-
ture of the eye’’61—is particularly telling:
In order to avoid confusion with things seen from a distance, and
so that the pictures of the visible things be experienced orderly and
distinctly, it is required of the vitreous humor to expand, by this
adjustment it collects the rays refracted in the crystalline [humor],
so that the figure from the crystalline will be painted distinctly on
the retina.62
Scheiner’s picture, like Kepler’s and against the perspectivist tradition,
was ‘‘painted on the retina,’’ and the crystalline humor refracted, rather
than absorbed the image. This admission already compromised the veridi-
cality of vision: the picture was a refracted, two dimensional representation
of the object. But Scheiner toiled to make this his last concession to the new
optics. Vision in the Oculus was still created by ‘‘visual rays’’ which came
from ‘‘visible things’’ and whose ‘‘beneficio’’ was to assure clear and dis-
tinct visual perception. Light was nowhere to be found, only ‘‘species,’’
which Scheiner manipulated in experiments, employing lenses and screens
to simulate humor and retina. Most importantly, Scheiner’s pictures were
well ordered:
At the terminal point within [the eye] the borders of the remote
thing are arranged, so the right appears at the right side of the eye,
the left at the left, the above—above.63
This final triumph of Jesuit epistemic tactics did not come easily.
Scheiner wanted to retain Kepler’s analysis of the crystalline humor as a
lens, but this implied the inversion of the image on the retina. So in order
that in the retinal image the right will ‘‘appear at the right side of the eye,
the left at the left,’’ he had to assume that the image was already inverted
when passing through the humor, namely, that the visual rays crossed paths
before entering the eye through the pupil, a strange feat indeed. Moved
enough by Kepler’s achievements and troubled enough by their naturalistic
and skeptic implications, Scheiner claimed just that, dedicating the whole
61 Scheiner, Oculus, 124.
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid., 38.
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second part of the first book of Oculus to demonstrating empirically this
pre-eye crossing of rays.
A Jesuit scholar could not overlook, let alone accept the solipsistic im-
plications of Keplerian optics. The attempt to preserve the visual veridical-
ity of Aristotelian epistemology while incorporating the new science was at
the heart of the Jesuit project around the turn of the seventeenth century.64
Scheiner managed to save the teleology of vision while preserving Kepler’s
empirical and geometrical infrastructure: the rays are refracted, the images
are inverted, but the eye is still fully successful in fulfilling the function it
was ‘‘assigned by God.’’ Yet avoiding Kepler’s boldest move—the conver-
sion of optics from visual rays to light—had a price as well. Scheiner could
not benefit from those of Kepler’s achievements which depended on the
mathematical-physical nature Kepler ascribed to light, such as the inverse
square law.65 At the end of his analysis, Scheiner remained committed to
the one-to-one correspondence between object and perceived image that
was both the great achievement and the clear boundary of the perspectiva
tradition:
All rays by which a visible [object] is carried [derivatur] into some
point in the organ of vision are called visual rays; but some are less
important and secondary, whether mediated or diffracted: but one
[that is] principal, primary and immediate . . . enters the organ of
vision that senses the form of colors, and . . . [this is the ray] that
is sensed.66
DESCARTES: THE COLORS OF THE RAINBOW
Some Keplerian successes indeed defied the Jesuit compromise. One optical
phenomenon which the new light optics was much better equipped to deci-
pher—but at the price of full commitment to turning optics from vision to
light—was the rainbow.67
64 Peter Dear, Discipline & Experience: The Mathematical Way in the Scientific Revolu-
tion (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), esp. Chapter 2; and Rivka Feldhay,
‘‘Mathematical Entities in Scientific Discourse’’ in Biographies of Scientific Objects, ed.
Lorraine Daston (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), 42–66.
65 C.f. Ofer Gal and Raz Chen-Morris, ‘‘Archaeology of the Inverse Square Law, Part I,’’
for the dependence of Kepler’s inverse square law on his physics of light.
66 Scheiner, Oculus, 73.
67 Boyer, The Rainbow, 134; 150.
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The aerial colors of the rainbow presented a difficult challenge to Aris-
totelian theories of vision and of light because color, according to Aristotle,
is a quality of opaque bodies. The rainbow, therefore, could neither be a
property of the transparent air, nor of light, which is not a body.68 This
problem continued to bother opticians and Aristotelian commentators
through the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, and in 1619 Scheiner’s fel-
low Jesuit Horatio Grassi still insisted: ‘‘the air cannot be illuminated.’’69
Kepler noticed early on that taking light as a physical flow suggested a
way of solving the mystery of the rainbow by assuming that ‘‘the propor-
tion of the angles of refraction constitutes . . . that a color is green, blue,
etc.’’70 This type of consideration caused Descartes to declare Kepler his
‘‘premier maıˆtre en optique’’71 and to adopt optics as his model for the
mathematical physics at which he was striving.72 Since the rainbow ap-
peared ‘‘whenever there are drops of water . . . illuminated by the sun’’
Descartes could use Kepler’s light optics to explain its colors by the refrac-
tion of the ‘‘rays of light . . . against those drops, and from there toward
our eyes.’’73 This became Descartes’ paradigm of a mathematical analysis
providing causal understanding of a physical phenomenon.74
One finds in traditional optics attempts to explain colors in terms of
‘‘more or less illumination,’’75 but Descartes’ analysis had little to do with
those. The various colors, in his account, were direct effects of the very
angles of refraction. This was a physical hypothesis, albeit formulated
mathematically, so the exact details—which angle creates what color—
could be filled in experimentally. Simulating a rain drop with the traditional
instrument of empirical optics, the water globe, employed in this role at
least since Alhacen,76 Descartes found that when the angle DEM between
the globe, the eye and the center of the sun was 42, the color observed was
68 Aristotle, De Anima, Bk. 2, Ch. 7 and De Sensu et Sensibili, Bk. I, Ch. 3.
69 Horatio Grassi, The Astronomical Balance, in The Controversy on the Comets of 1618:
Galileo Galilei, Horatio Grassi, Mario Guiducci, Johannes Kepler, ed. and trans. Stillman
Drake and C. D. O’Malley (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1960), 122.
70 Kepler, GW, 14:50–51.
71 Rene´ Descartes, Oeuvres, ed. Victor Cousin (Paris, 1824) 7:161.
72 John Schuster and Stephen Gaukroger, ‘‘The Hydrostatic Paradox and the Foundations
of Cartesian Dynamics,’’ Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 33A (2002):
535–72.
73 Descartes, The World, 85.
74 For a recent careful analysis and reproduction of Descartes experimental work on the
rainbow see Jed Z. Buchwald, ‘‘Descartes’ Experimental Journey Past the Prism and
Through the Invisible World to the Rainbow,’’ Annals of Science 65 (2007): 1–46.
75 Boyer, The Rainbow, 150; Eastwood, The Geometrical Optics of Robert Grosseteste.
76 See, e.g., Antonio de Dominis, De Radiis Lucis in Vitris Perspectivis et Iride (1611).
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brilliant red, and so, to a lesser degree, when the complimentary angle KEM
was more or less 52 (see Figure 2, page 209). ‘‘If these points are viewed all
together, without our noting anything about their position except the angle
at which they are seen, they must appear as a continuous band of red,’’77
he concluded.
Maintaining optics’ mathematical language and methods, Descartes,
following Kepler, turned it into a branch of natural philosophy. Yet despite
the new project, his early experiments were still rooted in traditional optics;
not only in the use of the water globe, but, more fundamentally, in privileg-
ing the eye as the significant station of the optical process: the rays ‘‘act . . .
toward the eye’’ and the angles are taken from the eye (see Figure 3, page
209). Once the mathematical questions received their causal-physical im-
port, however, the eye lost its privileged status: the angles of the rainbow
do not refer to the eye; the rays fall on different screens and appear the
same from different viewpoints. Disappearing together with the eye was the
water globe; no longer attempting to mimic raindrop and eye, Descartes
constructed a physical-experimental model of abstract refraction and ab-
stract projection with a prism (see Figure 4, page 210). The water globe and
the raindrop had become particular cases of refracting surfaces, generally
represented by the prism; the retina was now a particular case of a screen,
generally represented by ‘‘cloth or paper.’’ The colors of the rainbow were
thus produced strictly by refraction of light rays. The eye was completely
incidental to the phenomenon; ‘‘nor does the angle under which [the colors]
appear need to be of any particular size, for this can be changed without
any change in them.’’78
Casting the eye out, Descartes completed Kepler’s re-application of tra-
ditional optics—the mathematical investigation of lines of sight—to the be-
havior of light. His optics was now a bona fide experimental-mathematical
natural philosophy, which he could direct at investigating the very nature
of colors. If colors were not optical phenomena in the traditional sense,
neither modifications of the visual rays ‘‘on the way to the eye,’’ nor partial
reflections of objects’ forms (as they were for Aristotle79), what could they
be? How were colors produced and what did we sense in them? Descartes
answered in mechanical terms: the motion of light particles. The homoge-
neous particles of light moved rectilinearly in uniform velocity. Refraction
77 Rene´ Descartes, The World and Other Writings, ed. and trans. Stephen Gaukroger
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 86.
78 Ibid., 87–88.
79 Aristotle, Meteorology, in CW, Book 3, Ch. 2, 600.
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FIGURE 2: ‘‘. . . I discovered . . . when the sun came from the part of
the sky marked AFZ, my eye being at point E, when I placed this globe
at . . . BCD, its part D appeared to me completely red and incomparably
more brilliant than the rest . . . whether [I moved or it moved, so long
as] the line DE . . . made an angle of approximately 42 degrees with the
line EM . . . D always appeared equally red’’ (Descartes, Discourse 8
of the Meteors, p. 85). Source: Rene´ Descartes, The World and Other
Writings, ed. and trans. Stephen Gaukroger (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1998), 86.
FIGURE 3: ‘‘Let AFD be a drop of water . . . consider one of these rays
in detail: EF . . . instead of passing directly through G, is deflected
toward K, is reflected from K toward N, from where it goes toward the
eye P . . . or it is reflected once more from N to Q, and from there is
turned toward the eye R’’ (Descartes, Discourse 8 of the Meteors, p.
92). Source: Descartes, The World and Other Writings, ed. and trans.
Gaukroger, p. 92.
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FIGURE 4: ‘‘I observed that the ray, passing through this opening and
from there making for the cloth or paper FGH, paint all the colors of
the rainbow on it’’ (Descartes, The World, 87–88). Source: Descartes,
The World and Other Writings, ed. and trans. Gaukroger, p. 88.
and reflection imparted rotary motion on the particles, and the velocity of
this rotation depended on the relative place of the particle in the ray when
touching the refracting surface. The rotation was the color: this explained
why the same colors were created by the same angles of refraction and were
always in the same order. Descartes was quick to point out the epistemolog-
ical consequence of this mechanization of colors:
I cannot accept the distinction that Philosophers make between
true colors and others which are only false or apparent. For be-
cause the entire true nature of colors consists only in their appear-
ance, it seems to me to be a contradiction to say both that they are
false and that they appear.80
If colors were modifications of light rather than properties of the ob-
ject, they could not be held to the distinction between true and apparent:
80 Ibid., 91.
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their truth was their appearance. It was only when required to provide
an intelligent observer with genuine re-presentation of objects that colors,
images, and other optical phenomena could be either true or false. Other-
wise, especially when ‘‘appearances’’ could be on ‘‘cloth or paper’’ just as
on the retina, they were simply causal effects. And if optics was no longer
concerned with studying epistemic processes but merely the transportation
of light and its effects, it had no place for such an observer.
KEPLERIAN OPTICS AND ITS TRAVAILS
The success of Descartes’ theory of the rainbow was predicated on casting
the human observer out of optics. Oblivious to the distinction between true
and false, optics was thus stripped of its role as an epistemological anchor.
Estranging objects and their visual representation it became, instead, a
source of epistemological anxiety. This was the anxiety that Kepler at-
tempted, with the aid of irony, to sidestep. Descartes addressed it head on:
We must take care not to assume—as philosophers commonly
do—that in order to have sensory perception the soul must con-
template certain images transmitted by the objects to the brain; or
at any rate we must conceive the nature of these images in an en-
tirely different manner.81
Whatever comprises our ‘‘sensory perceptions,’’ Descartes was claiming,
could not be ‘‘confined to the requirement that they should resemble the
objects they represent.’’82 The main assumption of the Aristotelian-perspec-
tivist tradition, that vision carries its own criteria of veridicality, was at best
naı¨ve.83 The ‘‘philosophers’’ took for granted that our senses truly re-pres-
ent the objects, that they furnish the intellect with resemblances. However,
in assuming that, they had nothing on which to rely but the viciously circu-
lar belief that ‘‘unless this were so, the eye would not see the object dis-
tinctly,’’ as Pecham had it, or that the ‘‘function’’ of the eye was ‘‘to avoid
confusion,’’ as in Scheiner’s rendition.
81 Rene´ Descartes, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, trans. John Cottingham,
Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985),
1:165.
82 Ibid.
83 Gaukroger in Antoine Arnauld, On True and False Ideas, ed. and trans. Stephen Gauk-
roger (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990), 4–10.
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Descartes carefully worked his way through the skeptical implications
that Kepler attempted to avoid. Retinal images bore no resemblance to the
original object. Furthermore, as we have recourse only to these retinal im-
ages, we are ‘‘uncertain . . . that the light which we see as if in the Sun exists
outside us, in the Sun.’’ Thus, when ‘‘pain and color . . . are judged to
be certain things existing outside our mind, it is absolutely impossible to
understand in any way what things they are.’’84 In his early Regulae Des-
cartes taught his reader how to think of sensual representation without
resemblance by turning Aristotle’s most celebrated metaphor of vision on
its head: ‘‘sense perception occurs in the same way that wax takes an im-
pression from a seal,’’ he writes.85 This was a direct allusion to the ‘‘anal-
ogy’’ one finds in De Anima,86 but Aristotle did not use his seal and wax
metaphor simply to ‘‘explain sense-perception through Touch.’’87 It was to
explain how it can be that what we sense is not just true of the object, but
inseparable from it, even though the object itself remains remote.88 This
was particularly pertinent, of course, in the case of vision and its remote
objects: ‘‘the air . . . sets the sight in motion, just as if the impression on
the wax were transmitted as far as the wax extends.’’89 Tellingly, Aristotle
employed the same metaphor to dismiss Plato’s separation of matter and
form: ‘‘it is as meaningless as to ask whether the wax and the shape given
to it by the stamp are one.’’90
For Aristotle, then, the wax metaphor stressed the direct contact of
the object, through the medium, with the sense organ, and reinforced the
teleology, immediacy, and veridicality of sense perception. For Descartes
the metaphor conveyed the exact opposite: what touched the ‘‘opaque
membrane’’ was not the properties of the visible, corporeal body but ‘‘the
many colors of the light.’’ The same is true concerning all the senses; they
84 Rene´ Descartes, Principles of Philosophy, trans. Valentine Rodger Miller and Reese P.
Miller (1644; Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1983), Prop. 67, 30.
85 Rene´ Descartes, ‘‘Rules for the Direction of the Mind,’’ in The Philosophical Writings
of Descartes, 1:40. See also Dennis L. Sepper, Descartes’s Imagination: Proportion, Im-
ages, and the Activity of Thinking (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), esp.
211–22, 242–53
86 Aristotle, On the Soul (De Anima), J. A. Smith (trans), Bk. 2, Ch. 1.
87 Aristotle, ‘‘Sense and Sensibilia’’ in CW, Ch. 3, 1:696, 700–703. Aristotle’s attitude to
the issue of touch is complex. In De Anima he declares that ‘‘the primary form of sense is
touch,’’ while in De Sensu et Sensibili he mocks ‘‘Democritus and most of the natural
philosophers [who] proceed quite irrationally’’ in thinking of ‘‘all objects of sense as
objects of Touch’’ (De Anima, Bk. 2, Ch. 2; De Sensu et Sensibili, Ch. 4).
88 Aristotle, De Anima, Bk. 2, Ch. 12.
89 Ibid.
90 Op. cit., Ch. 1.
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provided no direct re-presentation of the sensed objects. The unity of the
senses, which for Aristotle meant that remote objects of vision were repre-
sented as reliably as the immediate objects of touch, meant for Descartes
that the images provided by vision did not resemble their objects any more
than the sensations of smell or taste.91
In the Regulae Descartes expressed the opaqueness of the relations be-
tween sense perceptions and their objects by envisioning a grammar of line
segments and their arrangements which represented the various sensible
qualities to their respective sentient organs.92 There was no inherent corre-
spondence between the ‘‘objects of the sense’’ and the objects they were
purported to represent; the relation between those different types of objects
was neither transparent nor self-authenticating; sensations needed to be de-
ciphered. A few years later, working on his Le Monde, Descartes under-
scored the non-transparency of sense representation, the need to decipher
and infer objects from sensations, by replacing the wax metaphor with a
linguistic analogy:
Now if words, which signify something only through human con-
vention, are sufficient to make us think of things to which they
bear no resemblance, why could not Nature also have established
some sign which would make us a sensation of light, even if that
sign had in it nothing that resembled this sensation?93
The wax metaphor implied that the relation between objects and sensa-
tions was causal and mediated rather than essential; the geometrical anal-
ogy stressed that perceptions do not resemble objects; the words metaphor
made this relation no more essential a bond than the ‘‘human convention’’
which related words to things. Again, Descartes picked an Aristotelian
trope only to subvert its meaning. ‘‘Spoken words,’’ writes Aristotle in De
Interpretatione,
are the symbols of mental experience, and written words are the
symbols of spoken words. . . . mental experiences, which these
directly symbolize, are the same for all, as also are those things of
which our experiences are the images.94
91 See Michel Foucault, The Order of Things (London: Tavistock, 1970), 50–51.
92 Descartes, Rule Twelve, ‘‘Rules for the Direction of the Mind,’’ 40–41.
93 Descartes, The World, 4; C.f. Stephen Gaukroger, Descartes: An Intellectual Biography
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 276–90.
94 Aristotle, De Interpretatione, in CW, Ch. I, 16a, 3–8, 1: 25.
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Aristotle specifically limited the contingency of linguistic representation to
sounds and written characters: since it was the objects themselves which
were re-presented in the human mind, their mental images could be only
what they actually were, hence were identical for all humans. Sensual re-
presentation, in the Aristotelian tradition, was a series of re-productions of
properties of the thing itself: in the medium, in the sense organ, in the mind,
in language. This process of representation was contingent only, if at all, at
the stage of naming mental images with words—the same objects might
have been designated by different words. Descartes reversed the analysis:
the ‘‘action that signifies’’ was the motion of light which was reflected from
the visible thing, through the medium, to the retina, which created on it an
image whose relation to the thing—its status as a sign—was no more essen-
tial than that of words to concepts. Returning to words in his Dioptrics,
Descartes stressed again that it was exactly this contingency and the separa-
tion ‘‘between the object and its image’’ that his geometrical and linguistic
analogies purported to convey:
our mind can be stimulated by many things other than images—by
signs and words, for example, which in no way resemble the things
they signify . . . in no case does [even] an image have to resemble
the object it represents in all respects, for otherwise there would
be no distinction between the object and its image.95
These were the full epistemological consequences of Kepler’s optics,
and Descartes resolutely elaborated them. The process by which the images
were created belonged to light. It owed inherent allegiance neither to the
eye nor to the objects; both were just accidental points off which light hap-
pened to bounce. This was not a random or capricious process: the same
image on the retina could be assumed to be the outcome of the same proc-
ess, and therefore to represent the same object, just as a word always signi-
fied the same object. But this uniformity was the only anchor for our trust
in our perceptions, and in itself it was nothing more than the regularity of
cause and effect: from the epistemological foundation of all science, vision
had become dependent on science as the guarantor of its limited relia-
bility.96
95 Descartes, Philosophical Writings 1: 165.
96 Alison Simmons, ‘‘Are Cartesian Sensations Representational?’’ Nouˆs 33 (1999):
347–69.
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DESCARTES’ DOUBT
One can discern three competing interpretations of Descartes’ skepticism in
recent scholarship.97 A long philosophical tradition presents the anxiety
that we may be completely wrong as the very core of ‘‘the modern condi-
tion,’’ and Descartes as its radically innovative author.98 Descartes’ doubt,
in this interpretation, was the result of a failed ‘‘quest for certainty.’’ Setting
the bar for proper knowledge at no lower than mathematical certainty, Des-
cartes came to worry if we can know anything at all. This was altogether
different from the ancient skeptical warning that we are often mistaken,
and it stems from Descartes’ novel concept of the mind: an enclosed internal
space, in which mental entities ‘‘represent’’ through the ‘‘veil of ideas’’ a
world made out of entities of a completely different kind.99
A competing interpretation rejects the revolutionary modernity of Des-
cartes and situates him within skeptical trends of his time, relating to
demons, madness, dreams, and, most significantly, vision.100 This interpre-
tation puts particular stress on the rediscovery of ancient skeptical texts and
the subsequent revival of Pyrrhonianism,101 though the full indebtedness of
Descartes’ ‘‘hyperbolic doubt’’ to the ancients is debated.102
Closest to our analysis are recent studies of the relation between Des-
cartes’ skepticism and his science. According to one approach, the worry
about the failure of the senses to represent reality is an implication of the
mechanistic philosophy underlying his science: the qualities of physical ob-
jects include only extension, figure and motion, completely unlike the ideas
in our mind. Consequently, ‘‘human beings . . . are systematically and con-
stantly deceived in ordinary sense experience.’’103 Another approach pres-
ents Descartes’ skepticism as a critique of Aristotelian sense-based science,
serving him in clearing the way for his ‘‘method,’’ which, empirical and
97 Jose´ Luis Bermu´dez, ‘‘Scepticism and Science in Descartes,’’ Philosophy and Phenome-
nological Research 57 (1997): 743–72.
98 Paul Edwards, Encyclopedia of Philosophy (London, 1967).
99 Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton, 1979).
100 Stuart Clark, Vanities of the Eye: Vision in Early Modern European Culture (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2007), esp. 334–43.
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hypothetically deductive, has little to do with an a priori quest for cer-
tainty.104
The development of optics from Kepler to Descartes suggests a rever-
sal: it was the science—theoretical optics and astronomical observation—
that gave rise to the philosophical skepticism.105 The optical angle provides
clear answers on the points of contention between the different interpreta-
tions of Descartes’ skepticism. It is a novel worry, even if it is sometimes
elaborated in traditional terms. It is founded on an analysis of perception
which would have been completely foreign to people living in both the an-
cient and medieval eras; on Cartesian science, modeled after Kepler’s optics,
preceding and prompting metaphysical reflection. It is also a wholly genu-
ine anxiety, not rhetorical or argumentative, and it is not directed against
old science. The doubt stems immediately and disturbingly from the very
success of the New Science.
Descartes’ skepticism was expressed in its full power not in any of his
overly-read ‘‘philosophical’’ writings but at the heart of his properly ‘‘scien-
tific’’ texts, and most vividly in the famous illustration from the Dioptrique
(see Figure 1, page 197). It is a depiction of a real experiment, conducted
also by Scheiner and Schott: observing the world as it projected on the
retina of an ox eye.106 Yet it is as much an emblem of the success of the
new optics and the disconcerting ramifications of this success, in all their
paradoxical entanglement. The observer has disappeared from optics, but
not the eye. Detached from the viewer, it is now re-absorbed into the mech-
anistic account and the empirical inquiry. Yet it is no longer the end of the
visual process, merely an arbitrary point of reference, an un-privileged sta-
tion in the natural process; ‘‘the eye of a newly deceased man . . . an ox or
some other large animal’’ tells as much of its operations as a living human
eye could. This is already a clear rejection of Aristotle’s position that ‘‘sight
is the substance of the eye . . . when seeing is removed the eye is no longer
an eye.’’107 Having detached eye and sight, Descartes proceeds to cut
‘‘through the membranes.’’ He covers the dead eye with ‘‘some white body,
104 Stephen Gaukroger, Descartes; Gaukroger, Cartesian Logic (Oxford, 1986); and Gau-
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sian Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 221–56, and Garber, Des-
cartes’ Metaphysical Physics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 94–103.
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the Camera Obscura, 8.
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thin enough to let daylight pass through it,’’ and observes the images ap-
pearing on the cover. ‘‘The images . . . on a white cloth in a dark chamber
are formed there in the same way and for the same reasons as on the back
of the eye,’’ Descartes concludes with ‘‘admiration and pleasure.’’ But the
implications are disconcerting: the eye is no longer a window, it is a screen;
it is no longer through it that we observe, but at it.108
Descartes’ skepticism was not about vision; it was visual skepticism.
Descartes did not re-discover what was indeed noted since antiquity, that
our vision was not to be trusted. Rather, he invented the eye of the mind,
modeled on but completely independent from the eye of the flesh, and in
this reversed the epistemological role of vision. From being the guarantor
of our knowledge and a paradigm of direct acquaintance, vision became a
metaphor for mediation. It was a paradoxical insight: by accepting that
knowing is seeing and understanding how we see, Descartes was convinced
that we may not know at all.
CONCLUSION
This then is the optical paradox. It is, in Erwin Panofsky’s words, a Baroque
realization of the radical implications of the Renaissance’s ‘‘inherent con-
flicts’’109: Keplerian confidence in distant images cast fundamental doubt
on our sense of the immediate. The naturalization of vision leads to the
estrangement of nature. Scientific observation entails the disappearance of
the observer. Descartes’ skepticism is an epistemological elaboration of this
paradox.
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